[Interview] Bibi van Ginkel: “We are currently dealing with a ‘hybridisation’ of threats, which is a far more complex than the past”

Extremist threats are growing increasingly complex and hybrid in nature. Counter-terrorism expert Bibi van Ginkel (International Center for Counter-terrorism) outlines how the landscape of violent extremism and terrorism is reshaped by ideological blending, digital ecosystems, and transnational networks. “This ‘hybridisation’ makes it much harder to detect clear warning signs, coordinate responses for security services, policymakers, and practitioners.” An interview.

Could you please give us an overview of current developments in extremism and terrorism, including trends such as right-wing extremism and eco-terrorism?
“We are currently dealing with a ‘hybridisation’ of threats, which is a far more complex and fragmented threat landscape than in the past. Where, not that long ago, extremist ideologies were more clearly defined, like: jihadist, right-wing, left-wing, or ethno-nationalist, these days these ideologies are increasingly blending. This makes it much harder to detect clear warning signs, to coordinate responses, and to involve the right stakeholders. Security services, policymakers, and practitioners are facing a fragmented and fast-moving challenge.

Overall, jihadist extremism is still the most lethal worldwide, causing the most deaths, injuries, and attacks, according to measures such as the Global Terrorism Index. West Africa and parts of the Middle East continue to be major hotspots for jihadist terror organisations, with Somalia emerging as a new hub for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) posing significant threats from the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, with also big implications for security in Europe.

Meanwhile, right-wing extremism is rapidly growing, especially through a strong connection between online spaces and offline violence. Many of these attacks are carried out by lone actors or small groups, which we refer to as ‘leaderless extremism’. On the left-wing and anarchist side, there are also overlapping ideas that merge together. Alongside these movements is a growing anti-institutionalist current, which is anti-government, anti-elitist, and conspiratorial in nature. Many of these different ideas come together and overlap.

This blending of ideologies is referred to as  ‘salad bar extremism,’ where people pick and choose different elements from various ideologies to create their own unique mix of beliefs.

This is clearly different from ethno-nationalist separatists, such as the PKK, or dissident republican groups in Northern-Ireland for instance, which still represent a more traditional form of extremism, as their cause is clear and easy to understand.

Besides a blending of ideologies in today’s extremism, another important factor is how easy it has become to access extremist ideas. Today’s online environment makes these narratives widely available, and young people are especially vulnerable - especially those who are searching for their identity or dealing with insecurities. These young people may be drawn to certain extremist beliefs that help them make sense of their world.

Young people might also be drawn to the appeal of nihilistic violence, which you also see happening for instance in the gaming environment, where they get desensitized to violence to a certain extent. But you also see this converge with organised crime, where it's quite easy to find young people to become runners or the executors of small tasks, or even killing sometimes to earn an easy buck, without them fully realising what they're doing.

We see more and more convergence between transnational organised crime and terrorist organisations for opportunistic reasons. In addition, new technology expedites some of these developments. Artificial intelligence (AI) is used to create deep fakes or false images, and so-called bot farms are used to spread high volumes of these fake ideas, disinformation or other extremist messages to manipulate the masses.. It is also quite easy conceal the narratives online, trying to evade the detection and moderation tools that online service providers and law enforcement use to detect this kind of messages, and so to escape being caught: it's almost impossible to find a win in a way.

The question is: with all the online content that is there, how can you stop extremist platforms? Even if you stop one, the group will easily move to a smaller, a closed or a more fringe platform or chat group, where they are less easy to be detected. And this is how people get sucked into these ideologies.

So this makes it extremely difficult – also with disinformation used by extremist organisations by right-wing, anti-government, or jihadist movements.

State actors are also playing a role here. Think of Russia really tapping into the cracks in societies – playing with the insecurities in societies there where you already feel there is some sort of polarisation or grievances. They capitalize on these insecurities and then they exacerbate those feelings to create social unrest and turmoil and chaos, which undermines the trust in democratic societies, for instance.

So, all of this is happening together and at the same time, given the fact that we're dealing with online as such a big vehicle of all of this, we are facing a sector where you see this tendency to techno-libertarianism or a sort of techno-authoritarianism, which makes it extremely difficult to make them partners in our battle with all of this.

So yeah, just to give you that brief overview snapshot of everything that's happening at the moment, which makes the task of countering and preventing a very challenging one in this day and age. 

You recently co-authored a policy brief on anti-institutionalism. Could you explain what anti-institutional extremism is, what regulatory approaches might be effective, and what challenges policymakers face in addressing it?
“Anti-institutionalism’ is a term we use in the Netherlands.  It is also called anti-governmental extremism. Whilst anti-government extremism in name suggest that it is opposing the governmentanti-institutionalism as a concept better captures the fact that in general it is about a broader distrust of government, media, academia, and elites, which are all seen as threats to society.

This form of extremism is often fueled by conspiracy theories that portray elites as malicious actors who aim to harm the population, whether that's through fake news, scientific misinformation, or oppressive governance. Some believe there's even a lethal agenda behind this manipulation.

Anti-institutional extremism draws on a variety of ideologies, what we sometimes call a “salad bar” of beliefs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, this intensified: some people didn’t trust the policies or the science behind them and instead developed alternative explanations. These ranged from spiritual solutions like karma and yoga to economic conspiracy theories.

The common denominator is a deep distrust in governance structures. That distrust sometimes leads to radical action. For example, the Reichsbürger movement in Germany believes that the current government is illegitimate. Similarly, the U.S. Capitol riot was driven by people who rejected democratic outcomes and chose to take power by force. These movements are often interconnected and globally inspired.

The complexity lies in the fact that this mistrust is not always unfounded. In the Netherlands, the childcare benefits scandal and the mishandling of gas extraction damage in Groningen left people feeling crushed by an impersonal system. These failures fuel grievances that extremist ideologies exploit.

Unlike jihadist extremism, which posed an external threat, anti-institutionalism forces governments to confront their own failures. That’s more difficult. Civil servants, from those issuing passports to housing officials, must now act as trust-builders.

There are also sovereign citizens, people who reject the authority of the state altogether. Their beliefs can be bizarre, such as claiming a right to a personal trust fund based on maritime law, or declaring their homes as embassies of their own “sovereign” nations. These ideas often seem delusional but emerge from real struggles, such as crushing debt.

While some of these beliefs may seem harmless, the increasing number of violent incidents, including arrests for plotting attacks against mayors, suggests a growing threat. The challenge for policymakers, especially at the local level, is to rebuild relationships, recognise early warning signs, and address underlying grievances without directly confronting conspiracy beliefs, which may only cause people to further withdraw.

So, although it feels like a new phenomenon, many of the same tools used to deal with jihadist extremism—if adapted with self-reflection and a broader lens—can still be useful.” 

How can administrative measures be used responsibly in CT contexts without compromising human rights and the principles of justice?
For some governments, administrative measures offer a shortcut—a way to avoid the higher thresholds required for criminal measures. But this can be problematic when used to bypass due process.

Let me first highlight the risks, and then I’ll explain how to use them responsibly.

Administrative measures can curtail fundamental rights, like freedom of movement with travel bans, without clearly establishing a legitimate aim. Often “national security” is cited, and then everything becomes confidential. This undermines accountability and transparency.

At ICCT, we developed a to address this. One of the key recommendations is to clearly define what constitutes a national security risk and to apply a proper threat assessment.

To responsibly use administrative measures, you must determine: Is there a legitimate terrorist threat? Does the individual pose a real risk? Do they have intent, methods, resources, and opportunity?

When you combine intent and capability, you can determine the threat level. But without this, administrative measures become arbitrary and violate procedural safeguards.

Another issue is overuse, using administrative measures when criminal law would be more appropriate. There’s also the risk of procedural violations: lack of notification, absence of appeals, and poor oversight.

Sometimes, these measures are stacked one on top of the other because of a lack of an effective  oversight mechanism, increasing the impact on the individual and violating the principle of proportionality. Measures without sunset clauses can effectively last indefinitely, unlike criminal sentences, which are time-bound.

Still, administrative measures can be used responsibly with youth or vulnerable groups, they can be a softer alternative to criminal convictions, allowing space for rehabilitation. Also, post-detention, they help manage residual risk during reintegration.

When designed carefully, with tailored oversight and a clear purpose, administrative measures can balance safety with human rights. The goal should always be safety and second chances, not punishment for its own sake.

Building on this, counterterrorism efforts may require rapid action. How can the rule of law be safeguarded in emergency responses to terrorism or extremism?
The need for true emergency powers is actually quite rare. Our systems already offer many tools that allow rapid responses within the framework of the rule of law.

That said, governments are often tempted by the logic of exceptionalism, treating terrorism as an extraordinary situation that justifies extraordinary powers. This can lead to declaring states of emergency too quickly or for too long, sidelining the usual checks and balances.

Emergency powers should be time-limited and subject to regular review. Unfortunately, over the past 25 years in this field, I’ve seen a pattern: governments invoke exceptionalism repeatedly, using it to justify bypassing normal safeguards.

Yes, there are true emergencies. But we should avoid building policy around the illusion of 100% safety. Some degree of risk is part of daily life. The rule of law must remain central, especially when things feel urgent.

As someone with experience in both academia and policy advising, what skills or mindsets should future CT professionals focus on developing?
There are many skills that matter, but one thing I consistently see missing is evidence-based policymaking. Too often, policies are rushed through in response to new incidents, without defining the actual problem clearly, assessing whether existing measures are insufficient, or identifying the real gaps.

Practitioners must learn how to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation. Understand how to define your target audience, map your policy environment, and build a theory of change that connects your activities to intended outcomes.

That means identifying short-term goals (e.g., disrupting a terrorist cell), medium-term goals (e.g., reducing recruitment), and long-term goals (e.g., rebuilding trust in institutions).

Heavy security measures, for example, may have visible short-term success. But they might backfire in the long run if they alienate communities or violate rights. Without proper evaluation, we won’t know.

In short: we need a mindset that values reflection, iteration, and responsibility. Policies should be grounded in real evidence, not political urgency or symbolic gestures.

This year marks the 15th anniversary of the programme, and you’ve contributed to it as a lecturer over the years. How would you describe your experience teaching in this context, and what impact do you think the programme has had on the participants?
Well, first of all, it’s 15 years of the program, and also 15 years of the ICCT. So in a way, we’re celebrating a joint anniversary here.

What’s interesting about the way this program has been designed over the years, reflective of how our organization works, is that we’ve been very agile and ahead of the curve in many ways. We’ve picked up on new trends and made sure to build those into the program. I’m not sure if I still have the program from 15 years ago, but we’ve definitely evolved. Over the years, I may have revisited some of the more classical themes, but we’ve consistently managed to inject the program with new developments, cutting-edge research and emerging policy insights.

The goal has always been to offer participants a real-time overview of the most pressing issues on both the policy and research agendas. And I would hope that over the years, participants have appreciated that, being able to tap into these discussions and apply them in their daily work, if they’re active in this field.

It’s also about helping them stay informed, keeping track of developments, and knowing where to look, recognizing the key researchers and experts you’ve brought into the program as the go-to people for the latest thinking. Hopefully, they’ve continued to follow those voices even after the program.

Interested in counter-terrorism and rule of law?
Join the 15th edition of our advanced summer programme (25 - 29 August 2025), to develop a deep understanding of how states can lawfully and effectively prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism—both online and offline—while safeguarding the rule of law and human rights in an increasingly complex and technology-driven global landscape. The programme includes in-person study visits to Europol and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, group discussions (under the Chatham House Rule), and panel presentations. Register now.

Read more
[Round table] Geopolitical uncertainty, (in)secure borders, and the 'foreign terrorist fighters' phenomenon
A decade ago, the rise of ISIS sparked urgent responses across Europe. Governments introduced strict legal tools to stop their citizens from travelling to conflict zones, often resorting to prosecution and stripping citizenships. On 11 June 2025, the Asser Institute invites you to the launch by researcher Tarik Gherbaoui, a legal scholar whose work investigates how European legal systems have responded to the FTF phenomenon.